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Friday, April Hth, 18G7. 
BIAJOR G m i a i ~  SIC VIXCENT EYRE, IC.C.S.I., G.U., R.A., in 
thc Chair. 
By Captain FOSIEIX, G.E.,?? IIer Xajesty’s Bcngal StaE Corps. 
The C I I ~ I ~ X A X :  I lint-e much plcasurc in introducing to you Captain 
Fosbcry, who will rend us a paper on tlic Unibcyla Campaign, in 
~viiich hc bow so distinguishcd n part as to earn tlic decoration of tlre 
T‘ictorin Cross. Although a subject of four or fire Fears’ standing, 1 
ham no doubt it i d 1  bc found to contain soim novel features most 
interesting to  tlic present audience. 
Captain FOSBESli: I should have liesitatcd to accept thc kind and 
flattering int-itation given me to address you to-day, had it not been 
for some considerations mhicli I mill, if you please, briefly lay before 
you. 
My hesitation was caused by distrust in my o v a  pon-er of telling 
the story of this campaign as i t  should be told. I felt that in tho short 
~ p a c c  of an hour it would bc most difficult to fill in tliosc details mhicli 
give lifc and reality to tlic fossil remains of n despatch or blue book, 
and general interest to figiires, only to be cslnuncd from thosc di5cult 
stratn by some unusually patient explorer. 
On tho other band, I reflected that tho story contained many 
episodes of interest to every soldier j and that were it told, Iiowoy-or 
imperfectly, some mhmble political and military lessons nlight yet bc 
drawn from it ; some more wide-spread interest not unmoi-thily 
cscited in scexics wherc ham been gained tlic espcrienccs, fornied 
the reputations, or dug the gavcs of some of England’s ablest soldiers ; 
som’e attention, drmm perhaps also to considerations mhicli, unknown or 
unheeded n o u ,  inay by-and-bye force themsel\-es (and terribly, too, 
should me be unprcparccl) on tho attention of thc entira nation. 
Indin for England, as Algeria for France, lias been aptly called tlie 
nursery of soldiers, but whilst France 110s kept her wholc army 
* How xajor  Fosbery.-h 
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THE UJLUEYLA CAJIPAION. 549 
instructed in tlie lessons learned in that nursery by a portion of it, 1L-e 
linve neglected on our part to do the like. lllgeria gave Frallce llcr 
Zouaves and Spahies ; her military rifle was invented for its conquest ; 
tlic tentes d'abrLwero devised to iigliten the equipment of her flyirlg 
columns ; and an admirable system of nlountain artillery and military 
train, so orgauiscd as to unite rapidity of movcment with CIIiciellcy in 
action. A hundred other military improvements, thus originated, ]lave 
pcrvaded lier entire army to its p e a t  and lasting benefit. 
Few French officers of standing are ignorant of the tactics to be 
adopted in an Arab campaign, or of the methods of maintaining, moviiig, 
and fighting with success a c01iunn in that difficult coimtry. Tlieir 
artillery, comnksariat, and transport also nrc a1ir;ays ready for instant 
and protracted service. 
Comparatively few English oficers know d i n t  Indian nlountain 
fighting means ; the remainder, when brought face to face with D brave, 
numerous, and formidable enemy, on ground rery different from the 
valleys of Aldershot, or the plains where so many of our triumphs 
have been won, arc apt to find tlie ordinary rc,dations, manuals, and 
drill books less than what is necessary for ipiediatc  succcss. English 
courage and English resources crcntually win the day, but both courage 
and rcsourccs are often wasted in the winning. True, TTC linre men 
such as Keville Chamberlain, Rcynel Taylor, Wilde, Vauglian, Giecn, 
Probyn, Kcyes, Brownlow, and others, whose rery names are n terror to 
tlie tribes with whom we arc continually in contact ; but tliey are so, not 
merely bemuse they are brilliant soldiers or diplomatists, but becnusc 
they possess a special knowledge, not possessed by the rest of our 
Services ; an cxperiencc, too, ~vliicli unhappily dies with tliem. 
It may bo objected that the Umbcyln campaign was n little war- 
one of those little wars we occasionally wage, which attracted thc 
attention of not one man in a hundred in England ; and further, that tho 
soldiers present were sufficient for it. To this I would renturc to reply, 
that ere its conclusion, the moremcnt of troops in support estciided 
to Xeerut, more than400 miles from the sccnc of action ; that i t  caused 
:L most grave excitement in Asiatic minds from Calcutta to Cabul, and 
bayond it ; and that towards the cnd of December, 1863, on this account 
alone, there were 110 less than 25,000 men in motion west of,tlic 
Jhelnm, whilst 3G British officcrs and ncarly 1,000 men, were killed or 
n.ounded, during the course of the operations. Besides this, in a 
country ruled by the sword, no war can be n little one whoso result 
d l  certainly decide the attitude of the warlilrc tribes outside a froutier 
of hundreds of miles in length, and possibly excite to action tfic tens 
of thousands of secretly liostilc fanatics within it ; both issues hung 011 
thc conduct of this Umbeyln war, and account for tlie anxieties of 
some of the highest authorities in India. Nor mas it sucqessfully 
concluded, but by the determined attitude of Sir Nevillc Chnmbcrlnin, 
who (like Nelson) mould not bc recalled; of Sir Hugh Rose, who, 
approving his determination, yigorously supported liim by D most rapid 
and effective conccntration of troops ; and fiiially, by the decisive action 
of Sir TVilliani Dcnison, T V ~ O  on his arrival, steadied tlie councils of tlic 
dnlinistmtion, and in his concise and able minute, pointed out clearly 
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550 THE UXIlISI‘L-1 CAXPAIGS. 
enough, tho disastrous results of hesitation, failure, or retreat. But if 
this mar really incolrcd such great results as it may bc shown it did ; 
if similar expeditions are to be again undertaken (on a continudly 
increasing sde) ,  and should it not be impossible that wo m:ty become 
eventually engaged in \-cry extensire operations in thesc same mom- 
tains for the very inaintcnance of our Indian supremacy; then, i t  
cannot but be well to diam attention to points, the careful considcra- 
tion of w.hicIl, may uaterially influence our success. On thefie grounds, 
therefore, I venturo to deliver this lecture, asking you to bear with 
its many imperfections. 
af ter  a brief description of the locclie O f  thc \mr, its causes, and thc 
enemy against whom it was fought, I proposc to consider its plan, 
conduct, and results, and concludo by drawing attention to such COU- 
siderations as scem most ~rorthy of attention. 
In doing this, I mill if you mill permit me, hero and tlicrc quote 
from descriptions of tiiy own, \nitten a t  tlic time, and repent occa- 
sionally sucli opiriioiis then expressed, as h a w  not xiceded modifications 
by the light of knou-ledge subsequently obtained. 
I must further express my great obligations to Colonel hdye’s able 
rehin24 entitled Sittnna, and to the sketches, photographs, and plaiis 
wliicli lie has kindly perniittcd me to copy. 
The ostensible cause of this war n-as the insolent conduct of a body 
of IIindostaneo BIussulmcn, fanatics of the Wahabee sect, under chiefs 
nanicd Noolrie Abdoola and Syud Xobaruck Shall. Tliia body of men, 
recruited from lower Bcngnl, and further strengtlicned by tlie preseixc~ 
of rebel sepoj-s, wlio 11ad eswped their just cliastisement a t  the time of 
tlic great mutiny, had talien up their residence at  3lullrah, a town 011 
one of the lower spurs of the Nahabun mountain, or LLliili of tho 
mighty forest,” as its name stands translated into English. This 
colony, mliose earlier history is well told in Cunningham’s history of 
the Sikhs, until tlic year 1858, had been placed a t  Sittana, nithiii 
sight of our frontier (tho opposite bank of the Indus). From this point 
they crossed tlic rirer by night, liarried our villages, drore off our cattle, 
and cc~rriecl away tlio wealthiest men for rnnsom into tho fastnesses of tlio 
Iiill. This became nnendurablc, and in that gear n force was placed 
under the command of Sir Sidney Cotton for their cliastisemcnt. 
Crossing the river, lie captured and bnrned the village, and bound by 
treaty tho surrouiidiiig tribes, to prevent the return of tho colony 
wvho had, --it11 few esccptions, escaped. They soon built, a new 
town at Nulkali, in the h a r t  of tlic iUal~abnn, and for a time remained 
But it was well known to our frontier men, that the bcliaviour of 
the sentimciits of tho fanatics wvitliin it, by wliosc contributions it was 
maintained, and by mhoso orders it acted; and the Cmbnlln Statc 
trials of lSGd sliowcd conclusi~-ely how m-idcly-spread xas  the con- 
spiracy, liow perfect mas the orpiisation, and Iiow well prepared tlic 
treason of those ivho planted this tlioni in our side. 
It might have been well to hare let them Iivc 3s n political barometer, 
]lad tliis been the only point in question-two thousand enemies, more 
or less, bcii!g of littlo consequence to our Indian Army. But WIICII 
. Yet t iis colony, placed beyond our borders, was but tlie manifestation OF 
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THE USIBETLh CAUPAIGN. 551 
they returned from their town of 1Idkah to Sittana, and corn- 
menced plundering on our territories, drilling on the one side 
of the Iiidus, arid firing at our troops on the other, it became evident 
that something must be done. 
This conduct did not only mean that sonm fern fanatics were 
getting troublesomc, but it meant also that tlie tribes on our border 
were becoining careless of treaty, and defiant of our pon-er, and might 
any day join in the depredations, and share the plunder of the lawless 
colony, all participations in whose actions, howover, they as j e t  dis- 
avowed. It also meant tliat a disaffection was spreading within our own 
territories, and as me had not then the clue to the soul of the ques- 
tion, it becamo nccessary to apply an adcqiiate punishmcut to the body 
represented by this Sittana colony, and act on i ihd ,  as has been so 
often dolie before, by dealing mitli matter. 
The question then arose, how were they to be reached and effcc- 
tively punished, placed as they were in the iininediatc neighbourhood 
of powerful tribes, whoin it was undesirable to proroke, and with 
whom they might take sanctuary and so escape. d glance at  tho 
plan of the position they occupied will slioiv the difliculties under 
which we laboured. 
Mulkah, their settlement, mas niost strongly situated in a cup, or 
hollom, high on one of tlie spurs of the great Jlahabun mountain. 
This mountain, by somo supposed to be the nil1 Aornos, which cost 
Alexander the Great more than two years of fighting and a large pro- 
portion of his hrmy, is situated in D bend of the Indus, isolated 
froin the remainder of the. chain of hills, on the one sido by the 
Cliumln valley, and on the other by tlic plaiiis of tho Eusofzaie, 
our proposed basc of operations. Could it be possible then, without 
serious resistance, to gain the line of the Chunila Valley holding 
the Ensofzaie, as P;C did, on the ono hand, and the fords of the Indus 
oqthc other, tlie CO~O~J- ,  and, as n-e hoped, the war, would be confined 
to this corner; and to tlie attitude assumed by its tribes, the Koodookelil 
and Judoons, which ~vould almost certainly be hostile, tho force to 
bo sent against them could afford to be indifferent. 
Not so as to tlic otlier tribes, however, who were warlike, numerous, 
and formidable, the best swordsmen and the best marksmen on the 
frontier and but few amongst whom had, froin past experience, learned 
to respect our niilitary power, or dreamed of the extent of our resources. 
With the Boncyr tribe, indeed, we had been alviays on good terms, 
and with tlicm our line of routo would bring us most nearly in contact. 
But it soon bccanie ~ I I O W R  that the colony, hearing of what was pro- 
bably in store for them, had sent out emissaries amongst tho tribes for 
the purpose of arousing t l p  fanaticism, a1nq-s latent in the mind of 
every Mahomcdan, however lax his religion, and the fears and jealou- 
sies of a uaturally suspicious and jealous race. There was an excite- 
ment alllongst tllein n-hid might possibly be allayed, but on the other 
hand, easily increased into active hostility. Fanaticism, moreover, is 
one of tho most capricious as ~ 1 1  as the most formidable of human 
motives. 
to r e x h  tho Chunils Valley with as The problem, therefore, 
VOL. XI. 2 P  
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552 TIlE UXBEYLb CA?JPAIGPF~ 
littlc offcncc to any onc as possible, linoing donc ~diicli, cscry hour’s 
march would mnoi-c 11s fu~tlier and fiirtlier from thoso to wlioni it’was 
incxpcdient tliat offencc should bc giren. Tliere wcrc tiro ways of 
doing this, eitlier by tho Durrun pass or tlint of Uinbcyln. Tlic 
iiso of the Durivn pass, from tho naturc of tlic coiiritry, would entail 
morc labour 011 the troops. That of tlic Uinbeyla offered n greatcr 
offence to thc tribes with mhom TVC desired to reninin on good tcrms, for it 
was thc one coniinunication betTwen tlic key of tlic BoncjT country and 
tlic plains below, and tile Ooroo ?iIountain, wliicli rose froni tlic strcani 
at tlic bottoni of tho pass, to a liciglit of G,000 feet on its nortlicrn sick 
was csclusi~-ely theirs, whilc tho pass itself tlicr considered csclusi~-cly 
tlicir own also. That wc liad foresccii this difliculty, was provcd lq 
tlic means takcn to overcome, or rntlier pi ~oziiid it. 
Tlic forcc to bc cmploj-cd, consisted of sonic 5,GOO men of all arnis, 
including tlie 71st IIiglilanders, lolst Bengal Fusiliers, half battery of 
Koyal Artillery, under Captain Griffin, tlic IIuznra and Peslimvur 
Nountain Train guns, 100 sabres of Colonel Probp’s famous reginicnt 
of ITorsc, 100 of tlic Guide Cavalry, 4 regimcnts of Punjaub Infantry, 
1 of Goorknhs, and tlic 32ncl Bengal Nntivc InfantrF. It assembled a t  
Nowakilla; in tlic Eusofzaie, on tlic 12th of October, 1863, and Gencral 
Sir h’. Chainbedah assumed tlio command on tlic 17th. 
Tlic greatest secrecy n-ns obscn-ed, not as to its objects, but ns to 
the nicans to bc tali~11 for attaining them. 
Thc Durrun Pass had been tlic onc sclectcil by sir Sidney Cotton for 
an cspedithi into tho ?&dinbun in tlic year 1856. It was but six 
rniles distant from the camp a t  Xowakilla, and through the tribes pre- 
pared for dcfencc nt botli points, it was natural that tlicj- shonld 
supposc wc ~vould select this one in preferenco to tho otlicr. 
In  orclcr to confinn them in tliis opinion, n small forcc under Major, 
now Coloriel, Kcyes n-as sent to encamp opposite-its nioutli, and this 
iiianccumc was instantly followed by a concentixtion of tlic encmy, who 
began stockading tile pass, and shon-ed tliemselres in large numbers 
on tlic liills flanking it. On tlic night of tlie 19th October, General 
ChamborIain broke up his camp ; and transmittin& orders to Colonel 
I i e p  to join &in at Pernonli, and n proclamation to tlie lloncj-r 
tribe, assuring tlieni of our fricndly intentions towards themsclres, lie 
marched on Roortuni Bazaar, e)i rmfe for Umbcyla. 
E s  mircli mas well contrired, n description of it thcrcforo may not 
bc unintcrestiiig. A iiiglit march is always an unccrtain and tryiug 
thing; but by forcthoue;Iit and good management, tho troubles of 
this wcrc rcduccd to a minimum ; still it liad its disadnntages. In 
night marching, tlierc is always, first of all, tlic c1ificult~- of gctting 
clear of camp. In Inclin it is n sceiic of most extraordinary, and at  
first apparently hopeless confirsion. Tlic groaning of camels, tlie un- 
psrliamcntary languagc of men wlio break tlieir sliins agaiust tent 
pegs, or tumble over ropes, tho shouts of thosc unfortunates who 
ham lost tlieir rcgimcnts, horses, or sen-ants in tlic darkness, miscd 
up with tlie b l o ~ ~ + s  of innllets on tlic tent pegs, and words of command 
from evcry possiblc direction, mnlic n din that must bc lieard to be 
npprcciatcd ; even after tlieficlt ilt and when ererx man is in his place, 
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TSIE UXDETLA CAXPAIIGK. 553 
the guides aro generally missing, and on this occasion wcro so, long. 
cnough to dcscrvo tho fervent blessings of the entirc forcc, which tllcy 
duly received as they welit to the front. 
At- last tho advance soundcd, Field Ofliccrs mounted, the Britisli 
subaltern thrcm 3rn-a~ cheroot and fell in, and thc long column was 
off, stccring to thc NS-E., through n dark and cloudless night, and 
fccling its way at tho ratc of some tmo and thrcc-quarter miles an 
hour. Thc night was cold, and the \Find from .the hills bitter arid 
piercing. The road, a x-illage tmck at  best, gradually became merged 
in fields and cultivation. But presently, at half a milo distancc, n 
bright light, likc a star, flnshcd out, and grndoally grexv larger and 
brighter, and on this tho iiiarcli mas directed. 1i.s wo advanced, a 
second and a third Rppc~ed at  rcgular distances. The first so011 
resolvcd itself into n blazing f i r 0  of dry thonls, siicltercd by n mat 
screen from the wind and the riew of the hills. Iiound it  lt-erc seated 
sonic four or five gipsy-looking men. Thcsc rosc as tlio forcc camc 
up, and, shaking back their long hair, gazcd in undispised woncler at  
the pcqt moving cloud of dust, out of -i-ihicIi flashed into their circle of 
light, born tho long teams and bright appointments of tlic heavy field 
battery, now tho red coats and white lielmets of the British line, thc 
Khaki uniforms of tlio frontier force, or tlie blue turbans and glittering 
lanco points of Probyn's Bowc. Then, as the last of the column 
passed, they turned mid daslicd out the fire,'wliilst anotlier and anotlier 
springhg up bcyond, defined tlic clistant road, and guided tlic force 
from light to light till tlic morning. Here and there a deep sandy 
rmino occurrcd, when strong xorking parties of Europeans, with drag 
ropes, ran tho guns don-n and up the steep ba&s, a ~ d  licpt all going. 
At last came tlic chidl wind that always precedes thc first streak of 
day, so mell laown to ewry one who 113s marclicd by night in India ; 
then D greyish light, and tlic first note of soino wild bird from thc 
jungle, and then the jagged liill line be3311 to sliom out, high against 
'the eastern sky, like a ruined wall, sccmmgly close to us. Presentlr 
the dny broke, the forcc mounted n long slope, and lialtcd in ccliclon of 
regiments on high ground abovc Roostum Bazaar, having travelled 
about elevcii and n half miles since starting. After n hasty meal 
and deliberatc pipe,. u-e wero off again, leaving the round towers 
and miid walls of Roostum to the left, and changing direction more to 
tlie eastward, KC pushed through the lower grounds towards the basc 
of the hills. These soon began to close in on either hand. A glance 
to the right showcd us tlic baggage of Kcycs' column winding through 
an  opening in the lower raiigc, and 1ooking.picturesque enougll in the 
bluo misty air of tlic early morning. At last KC entered a long, broad 
mlley, which narro\wd ~ d u a l l y  as wo proceeded, till, after crossing a 
small clear strcsm a t  Surlihowa, we wcrc fairly in tlic mouth of t,hc 
Unihcyla Pass. 
The pass promd to bc iihie miles in length, and was for the last 
portion of it, intricate and difficult. Nor was i t  possiblc to maintaiu 
much military order, cxccpt at  tlic vcry slon-cst pace. IIere whg 88eu a 
inule being dug out of a crevice by sappers, while II. Mi Infantry halted 
and more at t h e  &lay: there a jamb of mountain train ammnnition 
2 P 2  
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654 TIIE UXBEYLA CANPAIGN. 
or stores, the beasts'kicking and screaming twenty deep in an angle 
of the water. Now a few inexperienced men would push forward in :i 
likely direction on the flanks, and being brought up by impenetrable 
jungle, or the edgo of a precipice, return growling. Tlieii a block 
mould occur to tlie front, nhen  the entire force sat doim to drink cold 
water or smokc the pipe of patience. Fortunately there were nolie tn 
hinder. nad the enemy occupied in any force any one of the for- 
xniclablo defensive positions m-hicli the pass offered, there might have 
been trouble; for once a falso alarm of fighting, to the front, slion-ed how 
difficult it would hare been to lime united the troops in any part of the 
pass for attack or resistance. But tho brunt of what little fighting took 
PI-, had been borne by the advanced column, who had crowned thib 
heights on both sides of the gorge, and proceeded according to the 
established rules of mountain warfare. 
As the hills bounding tlie road were frequently intersected at  riglit. 
angles by almost impassable ravines, it was a t  first sight a puzzle to 
11s how this mas managcd so quickly and e5ciently as to keep the 
leading column well in advance of those that follox-ed, and the pass 
at-the same time entirely free for them. 
Tlic process nns pretty and soldierlike : two of tlie leading mnipanies 
were pushed u p  on either flank, tho enemy if disposed to be troublc- 
some, got n slicll from tlie mountain train, then the infantry charged, 
and cleared them out, and that pair of hills was safe. Coming dowi 
a t  tlieir leisure, the men fell in in rear of tlie columu, whilst two 
moro companies ascended the nest hills in their turn and cowred the 
advance, which was steady and n-ell conducted, as might liave been 
expected from its leaders. At last the force reaclied and occupied 
die most formidable gorge of tho pass, at  that point whence its strenin~ 
flow two different ways, to the rear to jo in  the Cabul River, to thc 
front to trax-erse the Chumla Valley and fall into the Indus under the 
dark shadows of tho black mountain. Then however the marcli ended. 
neither guns, commissariat, or baggage hm7ing arrived ; nor 11-as all 
fully up until four days afterwards. Those four days Tyerc sufficient 
to complete the combinations a d  assemble the forces of the tribe.: 
whom the route chosen, had exasperated, and the two miles of that 
marcli unfinished on the 21st of Odober, remained so uiitil the l G t h  
of December, two months later. 
Pending however tlie arrival of the baggage, 011 the 22nd of October: 
General Chamberlnin sent out a party of cavaIry under CoIoxiel Probyn. 
to reconnoitrc in tho plains beyond, sappere to improve tho road by 
which tho force was to reach them, and a regiment of infantry to 
occupy the pass in front during both operations. The cavalry avoiding 
the village of Umbeyla, which practically though not geographically 
belonged to Boneyr, took the southern side of the plain and proceeded 
as far as Kagah without resistance, finding the road pmcticablc for 
troops of all arms. On their may they perceived large bodies of tho 
tribes as+sembled at the Boneyr pass, who however professed tlieir in- 
tentions to bc peaceable unless an attempt should be mado to enter 
their pass or country. 
The time occupied in the reconnaissance however was suficie:it to 
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THE UMBEYLA U~JIPAIGN. 555 
change. their resolutions, and on the return of tlic cavalry, Colonel 
I’robyn found liipself opposcd by n considcrablo body of the enemy, 
posted in strong ground to clisputc his return. IIc therefore on their 
commencing to fire, at  oiicc charged them yigorously, cutting his way 
through them and went up to camp. Tlic sappers and tho 20th Nati\-o 
Infantry then became engaged, and Colonel Brownlox was followed in 
tho dark arid difficult rwine, by n large body of tlic cncIny, who not 
only fired continually, but closed ~ 5 t h  the rear guard, sword in hand, at 
cvery moment. 
TKO miles of this work brought him to thc pickets of tho ,camp, and 
tliese in their turn becoming engaged, a he3V niglit attack followed, 
blood mas shcd on both sides, and wc xverc at  oncc committed to a 
wnr with tlic tribcs, of which no one could guess cstcnt. To have 
:idvanced I ~ O W  mould ha70 been to abandon tlic Iiilc of conimu&ation 
by the Uiiibcyla pass to the niercy of the Borieyr tribe. And to 
take the lino of the Chulnln Tra1ky after abandoning it, would haye 
bcen to placc tho forro bctwxn tho BOnCyr tribe and tlicir allies on tllQ 
oiic hand, and tlic tribes of the Mahabun on the other, wit11 a11 unknom 
cowltry, ~dioso physical difficulties had already bee11 fomd to IX for- 
midable enough, incroascd ten-fold by the hostility of these tribes in rear. 
bc morc formidablc than that terrible Khyber pass so disastrous to 
the army of Cnbul; the i\Iahabun mountain mas absolutely un- 
known. Under thesc circumstances General CIiamberlain decided, 
and doubtless most wisely, to maintain his communications with his 
base, and suffering himself to be attacked wliero hc stood, to h-e tlic 
tribes a proof of our power, which s ~ i o u ~ d  convince them of tfc ~ p -  
lessncss of long mithstnnding it. IIe accordingly took up a position 
on tlic crest of the pass, and pushed up outposts on his flanks on eitlier 
side, giiring orders that thesc posts should bc strengthened by stock- 
ades or breastworks as fnr as possible. IIc also ordered up tho 
troops necessary for keeping open his comrnunicajion, and placing his 
gins in position, remained for n tinic on the dcfcnsivc. 
Tho situation was truly n peculiar one. Tho small portioi\ of tho paw 
occupied by the forcc (about 200 yards in width at that point), and 
filled with hugc rocks in every directiou, was dominntcd on both sides 
by almost precipitous hills ; 1 , j O O  feet up, tlic distance bctwecn thcm 
was only SO0 yards, wliich gives a fair idea of their sharp anglc of 
ascent. 
From below, the ridges immediately commanding the camp wcro 
plainly Tisible, and on tliesc it was proposcd at  first to establish out- 
posts, but on reaching those points, it was discovered that thcy in  
their turn !sere dominated by strong positions fueher up in tho hills, 
and it tllos bccame neccssary to push post aftcr post, into the inom- 
tdns one either hand until the process was only stopped a t  the Eag!e’s 
Ncst, on tho left flank, and the Crag picket on the right by the 1m- 
psibi l i ty  of adequately relicring or supporting thc troop6 at  grcator 
djstanccs. it  xi-as, no rclicf frcm below could reach the Crag 
picket in less tllan 45 Ininutcs, nor tIic Eagle’s Xest Kin less than 0110 
flour from tile time of leaving the a m p  ~ ~ I o I I - ,  and as these pmk wero 
The Umbcyla pass was snid by those n.110 had seen both; 
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55G TLIII U31BETL.A C.PJPdIGN. 
invisible from thence, assistance when rcquircd must hc sent for, wliicll 
practically doubled thc (listaIicc. 
Roads too had to be inado to connect t h s c  posts and brenstworls 
for their defenco, and tlie work entailed great fatigue on n large pro- 
portion of the force. 
But whilst tho incfliciency of 15s carriage, togctlicr with tho unfor- 
seen difficulties of thc pass had SO far tliroxm out thc General’s calcn- 
Iations, as to plncc him in an almost purely dcfensiw position, tBc 
dangers of that position were unfortunatcly atigmcntcd by tho nature 
of the defences constnicted. TVhcn timber, earth, or stone is available 
in large quintitics, it  cnght llot to be difficult on favouivblc ground to 
thron- lip such D dcfcncc as might bc held ap ins t  any enemy unpro- 
victed with artillcry. 
Thc cxamples wc h a ~ c  sccn of Uootancesc bamboo forts, Biiiiiiesv 
stockades, or Xcw Zcaland pnhs, show that the merest swages know 
how to do this, and to do it well. Wc lio?ie-i-er, as a rulc, I fcnr, 
ncglect such precautions, and omr-confident in our arms and courage, 
oftcn content ourselvcs by placing tho srnallcst and most imscicntilic 
obstacles bctwrcn oursclms and our enanics. Tlic slight dry stone 
walls a t  first buiIt here, barely covered their defenders from tho enemy’s 
fire, in some cascs the troops iusidc could scarcely firc owr thcm, in 
others tho enemy could; flnnlc defcncc on tlic onc hand, and defilndc 
on the other werc almost cntircly neglected. 
Thcsc littlc posts n-ciy: too often constructed ratlier with regard to 
the immediate prcscnco of matcriils and natural foini of the ground, 
than to its defence, and tho garrisons who occupied tliciii suffcrcd 
accordingly. Thc Englc’s Ncst picliet lost half its garrison from’ tlir 
enemy’s firc during four hours from tliese causes alone, and the Crag 
picket, though itrongly garrisoned, was twicc talren by tho enemy, 
simply because no flanking firc on any oiic of its faces was provided 
for. The momcnt such fire mas obtained by building of n trifling ont- 
work, the enemy ceased n t  oiicc to attempt it. 
TVc are strong, d l  armed, and well disciplincd, and Irnowing ow- 
selves to bc so, n-e arc too apt to forget tliat fanaticism, tlic elan of a 
body of xncn d o  arc content to rlic for one good blow at thcir enemy, 
will often g im tlieni for a moment 3 superiority ovcr tlic best troops 
in the worl?. 
It has oftcn bccn asked why do t.3Tants so rarely die by thc Iinnd of 
tlic assassin. Tlic answer is simply because 110 conspirator can b~ 
found, nctwithstnnding a11 professions to ilic contrary, who will under- 
take to fire the shot or plant the dagger, with tlie clear understanding 
tliat his death, without hope of cscape, must folloyc- thc nest instant. 
All hopo to get off sorncho\r, and thc act of looki11g back mars tlie 
enterprise. 
But amongst the fanatics of India sou x~ill find hundreds of men wlio 
will band themsclres together viith tho TerF purpose and intention of 
gaining a dcntli at your hands, so long as thcy can kill you. Tlicy 
w e p t  and triumph in the death itself, without arriire p e n d e  of any 
kind, and thus bcconio cncmics not to bc despised by tlic niost skilful 
and bravest soldiers. 
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THE UXBEYLA CAXPAIGX-. 657 
Of this character w r c  some of tlioso d o  opposed the force 111iC1er 
General Cliamberlain, and to their reckless bravery arc to bc attril)utec1 
many of tlic casualties that tool; placc. In some instances thcy actlIally 
clutclied the muzzles of thc camon, cutting desperntcly a t  tiic guilners, 
in others they t h e w  themselves fearlessly a t  thc slight brcastmorks, 
leaping, sword in hand, ainorigst their defenders, and either becoming 
tlic lenders of n successful assault, or dying tlic glorious death they 
fairly earned. 
On tlic 26th of October, tho enemy attempted tlie cstremc riglit of 
camp, but wcrc detected in thc act by CoIo~iel ICcycs, wIio soon 
after daylight took tho iiiitiatirc, a i d  drove them &llg the crest of tllc 
ridge from ono position to anotlier: until tliey finally took post a t  n 
place LCOWI~ afterITards as the Conical IIiIl. iu great 
force a d  lie liad but 200 men, he M t c d  011 the ridge opposite, a t  a 
distance of about G50 yards, and sent to cninp for reinforcements. These, 
consisting of mountain train guns, Europenn.lllnrksmen, and n Goorkall 
regiment, on-ing to tlic distaiicc, did not arrive until nearly tmo o’cIock. 
Tlic raiigc of tlic enemy’s positioii having been then ascertained by 
means of rifle shell, and fuzes cut and x!justed accordingly, marksme11 
werc placed in position, and gircn their distaucc ; tlie gnus mas1;eri by 
scctious moving in front of them, were drnggcd by hand into position. 
Tlic sections then snddcnly wlicelcd back, arid the guns and marI;snlcli 
opened a t  oncc on tlic top of tlic hill. The effect was almost iristant- 
ancous ; thc enemy completely taken by surprisc a t  tlic weight aud 
accuracy of the firc SO suddenly bronglit to bear on them, began to 
wal-er, Then Colonel Kcyes, a t  tlie head of his reginwrit, dashed 
across the plain, stormed tlie position, aud drom tlic enemy pell-mell 
in tlic direction of Laloo, capturing n standard, a id  cutting them 111) 
in thc uperation and several of tlic force, tlien returiied to camp. 
The men of Colonel Reyes’ regiment, tlic old Co1;es Rifles, so distin- 
piislied a t  Delhi, performed n sort of war dnncc round tlic captiucd 
standard, to tlic music of tlic sirinai, an instrument in sound inucli 
resembling the bagpipe, tho Europeaiis loudly cliecrifig them ns t h y  
niarched past. An oficer paused to look a t  this performarice, and 
admire tlie fino pliysiquc and warlikc bearing of thcsc wild soldiers. 
~ l h ,  said another, ‘‘ you arc astonished at this ; that’s oiily n standard 
they liare there. At Dcllii tliesc Patlians used to do tlie same thing, 
but they did it round tlic licarls of their enemies.” 
Tliougli beaten hoirerer, tlic enemy were not discouraged ; they 
Iiad arranged for a simultaneous attack 011 both flaiiks of the carup, but 
somehow tlic Boneyr peoplc failed to liecp to their eugagcmciit, 
which gave p e a t  offcncc to their allies. The nczt day, however, thc 
former determined to redeem their pledge, and tlireatened tlic Ead?s 
Nest and pickets on tlic Goroo mountain in great force. %ic 
General, therefore, reinforced tliesc posts, placing tlic left defences 
under Colonel Vaughan. IIigli above tho Eagle’s Nest picket placed 
on tlic extreme riglit of tlie line of defence stood n l a r w  sung:& or 
brcastworli of stone, ivliicli commanded that work, w h i h  its entire 
face was subject to enfilade. To its left arid a t  n lower level was 3 
line of troops, posted amongst broken ground, wliose left flmk rested 
11s tlley 
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558 THE UMBEYLA CAMPAIQN. 
on a knoll, on which were placed tlic mountain train guns. Presently 
the enemy gave a great shout, and waving their swords and standards, 
rushed down to tlic attacli, their marksmen dropping into every place 
of shelter, and firing rapidly to cover the advance of tho sword and 
spear men, who came up to tlie attack vith great boldness ; but between 
the base of the slope and the roclrs on which the picket was placed, was 
a little plain, some 80 yards in width, and here they bccanio fully ex- 
posed to the fire from t3e mork, which was so close, accurate, and 
deadly, that four hours’ fighting left them foiled, with a.loss of some 
300 killcd or wounded. The European marksmen alone are said to 
liavo put hom cle coiribnt 180 men, losing i of their own number, whilst 
nu Englisli oEccr and 40 other men lay killed or wounded inside the 
post, being nearly hnlf the nurnber originally employed for its defence. 
This action necessitated a far stronger occupation of tlic slopes of 
the Goroo Xountaiu, and still further weakened tlie force in the valley 
below. Breastmorks mere now built across the rax-inc at tho two cxtre- 
mitics of tlie camp, batteries constructed, and guns placed in position 
for their defence, and stone walls run up for a considerable distance 
into tho hills on either bank, to cover the troops employed. 
On the following day the Boneyr men came in under a flag of truce, 
asking permission to carry off their dead. They did not sccm humblcd 
or beaten : frankly admitted their defeat, but, pointing towards the 
greit  mountain, said tlicrc were many warriors there to take the place 
of those they werc now carrying for sepulture to the burial-places of 
tlicir fathers. Certain, however, it  was, that some of tlieir principal 
men had fallen in tlic assault, and tlierc fere racancies at  their council 
fires, which tlic tribe could ill afford. They now established a series of 
small posts on inaccessible points of the liill, outside the defences, and 
searched out with an accurate and constant fire the greatest part of 
the camp, causing several casualties, aud specidly annoying Captain 
Griffin’s battery. To this fire it mas extremely difficult io reply with 
effect, and the marksmen of the European regiments m r e  constantly 
employed in this service. 
On the 3Oth, h a ~ i n g  previously ieceivcd largo accessions of force, 
with whom came also the RCIih0011d of Swat, a spiritual Icader, whose 
position as regards these tribes is compared, by Sir N. Chamberlain, to 
that of the Pope of Rome tovards Catholic countries, they planned a 
simultaneous attack on the right, left, and centre of the position. 
Tliat on the left, or Eagk’s Best, was abnndoncd on the failure of tlic 
other two, which were, h o ~ e r e r ,  delirered with great enerav and con- 
siderable judgment. 
The Crag picket, which you see in tlic sketch here, had hitherto been 
only occupied by Colonel Kcyes (whose position is shorrn below) as a 
post of obser~ation, and on the night of the 29th was occupied lq 
t\vclw men only. The enemy, liowerer, seeing its importance and the 
command which its posscssion would givc tliem, approached it towards 
mtirning, overpowered and drove out tlie feeble garrison, and occupied 
the summit of the rocks with soinc 250 men, tlic remainder n-aiting on 
the ridges in the neighbourhood to take advantage of the confusion 
which their fire must produce at dqliglit in tlic posts below-. 
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THE UPBETLA CANPAIGS. 559 
The nine siirvirors of the picket, however, retreated only as far as 
tilo rocks at the base of the Crag itself, and, opcning fire on the enemy 
above, who were busy strengtliening their position, called loudy for 
support. 
Colonel Kcyes at once answered this appeal. Taking with him 
an oficcr and ten of his own men, he proceeded to join them, directing 
liis adjutant, Lieutcnnnt Pitcher, to bring up morc men as fast as they 
could be got together. 
By dawn he liad with him some screiity-five inen a t  the foot of the 
rocks, on whom the enemy poured a continuou? and heavy fire, hurling 
down a t  the same time huge stones, which caused sercral severe hurts. 
AS so011 as it was light cnougll to distinguish friend from foe, and 
liis left flank was covered by Colonel BroKnlon-’s corps, who moved 
out into the ral-ine below, he divided his force illto tjvo parties, gave 
the order to fix swords, and souDdcd the charge. ‘I’he Pathans gave 
D wild shout of “Allah ! Allah !” (in the name of God) and rushed at tlie 
Crag, scixmbling like cats from rock to rock, b3- tvays througli whicli 
but one man could pass a t  a time, in the face of a hot fire aud hcavy 
shower of rocks and stones. 
This daunted some of the men, and Lieutenant IJitcher who was 
leading at the time being stunned by a heavy stone, but ttco o@cers, 
C0101iel Kcyes and anotlicr, and about tvxnty-fivc inen, arrired at the 
summit whcrc tlicy became engaged in an exciting haud-to-hand 
conflict. Colonel Kcyes was sererely wounded, but tlic place was won. 
Tlie naturc of the struggle may be judged of from the fact that sixty 
of the enemy’s liillcd and wounded mere left 011 the ground, three 
standards captured, and the rest of their forcc mas so much dis- 
courqed by the action as to retire from that flank altogctlicr. 
Meantime an attack liad been made on the front of the camp, which 
was repulsed by the 71st and lOlst regiments, aided by tho fire 
of the guns in position, and a dashing charge madc by the Goorkahs, 
in whicli, however, the latter suffered severely. Their dead, when 
brought in, Kcre found to have been shockingly mutilated by the 
enemy, and from tliis time it came to bo an understood thiug, that in 
this war, quarter n-ould neither be asked nor granted on either side. 
A story is toldof an officerwho, seeing a stir upon the hill side 
amongst tlic European troops sent out to tho sceiic of an action fought 
t x o  days before, and a large group assembled about some object on 
the ground, ascended a rock above them to learn the cause. A curious 
sight presented itself. In tlie centre lay the mutilated body of 8 slain 
comrade, and at its liead stood a non-commissioned officer with a 
Testament in his haud. Nan after man came up, and to each wag ad- 
ministered a soleinn oath that from that day out t h y  would neither 
save nor spare, but pay that debt to tlic uttermost. 
That oath was nftcrnprds ire11 kept, and many n tall Pathan recreant 
sepoy and fanatic Nodem read Iiis fate in the stern eyes and pale 
compressed lips of those \die liad sworn to @ire no mercy. 
Tie euemy’s attacks I!OW became intermittent, and for a curious 
reason. l3eforc dying, i t  bcliovcs every good blussulman to r e p a t  a 
short prayer: failing which his soul is exposed to vexatious delays 
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560 TIIE UXBEYLA CAXPAIGX. 
and inconwxhxes on its road to paradise. An exemption to  this rule 
is, bomerer, permitted should llis death take place on his Sabbath, our 
Friday. 
In tlicir wars m-itli one mother, the mord or sinall matchlock ball 
was seldom so instantly fntal as to precludc tlic performance of this 
rite. Our bullets, slirapncl shot, and shell, were, howcvcr, on trial, 
found to be less considerate, and niany a pious Jlussulman pined in 
the cold, outside that heaven hc had died to win. Tlicrc mas but onc 
remedy, and in future they fought their more considcrablo actions OII 
their Sabbath only. 
This arrangcmcnt provcd welcomc to the force. The cliangc of base 
was effected, Pemouli being selected as the dep6t in place of Roostum 
Bazaar, and the Pass of Kanpoor made practicablc for the comxnuni- 
cation, 10 rcplacc that of Umbcj-la, ndiich it was proposed to abandon. 
Preparations also were made for transferring tho \vliolo force from the 
ravine itself and tlic heights of the Goroo BCountain, to a position on 
the south side of the pass at thc fiend of this road, and colnmuuications 
were pushed on torards tlic plain in admncc, for thc future use of the 
force. 
TO do this v i th  safety, strong cowring parties mere sent out to 
cover the vorking parties and sappcrs rmploycd. A Friday iiitcr- 
vcning, however, during the continuance of these operations, these 
parties pIaccd a t  a considcrablo distance from camp, from vliicli also 
thcy w r c  separated by deep and a11 but impassablo ravincs, became 
surrounded by the enemy, and only regained the position with the loss 
of their lender, Major Barding, who, refusing to leare his wounded to 
the mercy of the enemy, paid for his chivalry with his life, of Ensign 
Nurmy, of the 71st, and Licutcnant DougaI, of tlie ‘iDth, who were 
both killed, besides 34 others killed, and 37 vonndcd. Amongst the 
latter were Oliphant, of the Goorlialis, a man of a nanie famous in 
India, and the gallant Bat tp ,  of the Guides, brother of that B a t t p  
who like him mas strick down in the forc front of battle, and whose 
latest words xvlien dying were 6‘ Dulce et  decorum est pro patria 
mori.” IIis conduct, and that of otIicr officers on tlic summit of the hill, 
alonc saved tlic corciing parties from n more serious disaster ; and it 
mas not until late at night that all returned to camp. Tliencc 
could be secn bodies of the cneniy with torchcs, following on the line 
of tho retreat, slaying the wounded, and plundering thee dead. 
Stragglers iiow and then arrived ; and one man, n private of the 71st, 
wlio had been stunned by a lieavy fall amongst tlio rocks. did not 
arrive until dnwn on the following morning, having escaped, by \d in t  
seems h o s t  n miracle, the parties of tlic enemy \rho pa!rollcd tlic 
sides of the hills. 
This  as the first succcss wliicli the enemy were able to obtain, aud 
it encouraged them proportionably. After this, however, there was 
ag?in a pause, during which tlic enemy rcceived reinforcements from 
Bajour and the more distant tribes, aud tlicir parades on thc level 
ground near Urnbeyla became imposing by their strength, and pic- 
turesque, from the numbers of gaily colouicd silk standards vhicli 
they carried, and the costumes of the different mountain men. 
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THE UiIIEETLh C-IZIlPaIIGX. 561 
On the night of tlic 12th of Korcnibcr t h y  nttaclicd tlic Crag- 
picket, which had becn greatly cnlargcd, and IIOW contaiIicd 160 inen ; 
and from ninc o’clock in the cvening until three in the morning, to 
tlic number of some 3,000 nicn, used c w r y  effort to force tlic post, 
Colonel Eiromnlow, WIIO liad before so succcssiuIIy defcnde(1 tllc 
Eagle’s Sest, was, ho\vcrcr, in command, and judging by tlic attitiitlo 
of the enemy that an attncli was imminent, furtlier strcngtliencd the 
position, cluriug the Inst few hours of daylight, by crcry means in his 
power. IIr! tlircir up traverses to intcrccpt tllc llcnry cnliladc fire 
from tlic opposite ridge, 400 yards distant, and by dusk Iiad cvcry 111an 
in  his placc, and prepnrcd* for the coming attack. Presently Captain 
IIughes’ guns from tlic position in rear, tlircn- n couIllc of sliell i~ i to  
tho enemy’s watch fires, which t h y  at  oncc quittcC1, ;11:(1 dcscendcd 
into the rarine below. LIcrc they ~ e r c  sheltcrcd fro111 tIlc firc of tllc 
worli, and nothing but n dull murmur told the clcfcndcrs that n nnme- 
roiw enemy, bcnt on attack, lap within SO yards of thcir slight 
dcfcnces. 
Now and then could bc heard some impnticnt cliicf marsIiaIIing his 
followers for attack, and, last of all, tlic dccp roiccs of the ~ V O O I ~ ~ I S ,  
or pricsts,dio blessed tlicir ‘I enfants Iierdus,” rind iiromiscd the joys of 
pnradisc to those about to die. Then n pause, and then arose n s!iriIl, 
wild cry, so wild and slirill that for n moment no one recognized it as 
the war cry of tlic Noslcm “A11ali ! Allali !” but it was instantly talien 
up  by 3,000 deep voices, and, with a xrilcl shout, tlieir heavy colmiiti 
quittetl its cowr  and rushed at the breastwork. 
Colonel Bromlow waited thcir approach and tlicn suddenly iourcrl 
it, and perforce they retired; in halt’ an hour they returned to tlie 
attack, and wcrc repulsed as before. Again and again they attempted 
to storm, and still thc firc of tho ~ ~ o ~ l i s  mowed them down as they 
came to closc quartcrs. At last making a most determined attack 011 
both sidcs of the wenliest angle of tho post a t  OWC, Iiurling large 
stones on its defenders, whom they confnscd and orcrwhclmed by tlic 
suddenness and vigour of this new niodc of attack, they got at  tlie 
wall itself, pulled i t  doirn, threw the stones on tlic defenders n-itliiti 
and werc masters of tlic corncr. 
JIany men of tlic garrison commcnccd to rctrcat, but Colonel 
Brovmlow, calling for volunteers and getting but four 01’ five, rushed 
at the place, turned tlic iiirnders out, rebuilt tlic ~ 1 1 1 ,  and held it for 
the remainder of tllc night. Tlic guns also from thcir position, 25.0 
yards in rear. guided, as to rangc and direction, by roicc from the 
post, opened fire, throwing shell over tlit? top of the rock into tlic 
rarirtc beyond and doing good senice, and though attack aftcr attnck 
follomcd, Colonel Brownlorn maintained his position with SUCCCSS, 
until tlic morning. 
A t  thrcc tlie fighting ceased, both sides being W X ~ ,  and tllc e1lcW 
Iiaving suffered considerable loss. Tlien n strangeincident occurrcd. 
011c of the enemy taking shelter under n rock yithin 20 yards of 
post, called to tlic garrison in Pathan patois to know if tlicy wwc not 
tired of all this noise and ginpomler-for his o r n  part 110 frcely 
into the mass n fire so close and deadly, that nothing living coil t d face 
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562 THE UMBEYLA CAXPAIGS. 
confessedlio was-to this a reply was made that they werc quite 
ready to go on. “ But,” said he, ‘ 6  don’t you think singing is better than 
fighting, sit quiet for a little and I will sing”-and without further pre- 
face IIC began singing in song after SOIIE;, tlie wild strains of lorc and 
mar, which stir the licnrts of thcsc mountaineers. Thc troops on our 
own side, many of them recruited from tlicsc very hills, took up thc 
chorus atid from the deep rmine, wlicrc his friends lay, came a chorus 
louder than ours, and now and then a sound of applausc which plainly 
showed how numcrous and how near they \\-ere. He was addressed 
from tlic post and complimcntcd on his singing and brayery, and 
asked if he w-ould not tokc service with tlic English, who would duly 
estimate both qualities ; to this Iic rcplicd, ‘; we have quarrelled and not 
yet settled our quarrel, when tlint is done I will consider”-and firing 
his matchlock at  the post in deEance, hc divcd iuto the ravine, and was 
no nioro seen. 
Colonel Brownlow’s men who had been 48 liours on continuous duty 
were relieved soon after daybreak b3- Captain Dayidson and men 
@f tha 1st Punjaub Native Infantrx. Tlic encmj- almost instantly 
made n ncw attempt, stormed the post before tlic inen were fairly in 
position, killing Daridson, who refused to Icuve his pmt and died as a 
soldier shouId, and n large nunibcr of tlic new garrison with him. 
The place had thercforc to bc retaken, a t  the point of tlie bayonet, 
by tho lOlst Bcngal Fusilicrs, under Colonel Salusbury. But pending 
their arrival, tlie advance of the ciiemy was sto ped by the fire of 
mountain train guns, and tlic heroic bclinviour of t e e 0  or four oficcrs, 
iiotably Lieutenants Yitciicr arid Young, who collecting D linndful of 
men charged them so vigorously as to save the main pickets, and 
give time for tlic arrival of reinforcements. 
COlOllCl Keses, tliougli still suffering sever el^ from his wound, 
sho\ved the greatest coolneos, and held the breastworks successfu11y, 
a t  n time mlien everything was in tlic utmost confusion, whcn 
tlicrc were but fcw good mcn available for defence, and a mass of 
camp followers, panic-struck soldiers, and baggage, blocking in their 
flight, the only road to tlic camp below. Colonel Salusbury, as soon 
as lie arrived, a t  oiicc formed his rcgiincnt for attack and stormed 
the Crag, lioading the assault, wvhich was made with that dash for 
vJiicli his regiment, as  ell as himself, haw long been celebrated. 
Slight skirmishing followed this affair, but on tlic 1StIi of Nonmber 
the arrangements for tlie movement having been complcted, General 
Ctiamberlain decided on retiritig Iiis left frank and concentrating his 
whole force in rear of wliat was before called tlic ‘‘ Riglit adranced 
pickcts.” 
Draving off by degrees liis nien and material froin tlie slopes of 
the Goroo monutain by 10 A.M., on tlic morning of tho 1Stli of 
November, liis force, Iia~ing pcrforrned a most dclicntc and difficult 
mowiient, had occupied, without molestation, a strong position on the 
soutlicrii siue of the pass, and had clianged their base cf operations, 
line of communication, and military position at one and the same time. 
l h t  here the enemy interfered. This instance, mere tliere no other, 
would conclusircly slicm tLc justicc of tIic opinions of Sir S. Cham- 
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TIIE UMBEYLA CA3fPAIGh’. 5 63 
berlain, and those mlio supportcd him, in his refusal to retreat, not 
only on account of the impolicy, but also on account of the danger 
i n d r e d .  Thc enemy mistook this change of position for retreat, and 
thereupon organized one of the most formidable attacks dclircrcd 
during thc ivhole course of the operations. 
They follomxl 11p thc retirement in great forcc to the lower pickets 
of the new position, drore out their defenders, and, but for the deter- 
mined rcsistancc of tho troops, would have entcrcd the camp itself. 
IIere were killed Smith, of thc 71st ; Chapman, the Adjutant of the 
lo l s t  ; Xurphy, of 14th Nntirc Infantry, nud Lieutenant Jones, a 
volunteer from tho 79th. Lieutenant Chapman, knowing his wound to 
be mortal, begged, but in vain, the retiring troops to assist Cnptniii 
Smith, arid leave him to his fate. Both were, howerer, killed, and 
their bodies not recovered until the 21st. 
On thc 20th tlic Crag picket, then garrisoned by two coinpniiies 01 
European troops, was again taken by the enemy. Two Officers wem 
killed, together with a large nnuibcr of their mcn ; and Xajor Dela- 
fossc, onc of the two sun-irora of the Cnwnporc Massacrc, in vain 
displayed the &-reatest bramry, in the hope of rallying the men, and 
still holding it. 
The post was rctaken by the 71st IIighlanders, under Colonel 
IIope, who, moving out from the breastfforlr, advanced, in  face 
of a tremendous fire, steadily, and without a single break, to the summit, 
to which two roads had by tliis time been constructed. ‘rllis they did 
without the smallest appearaxice of hurry, their pace bcing regulated 
by Colonel Hope himself, who, briefly saying, “71st, 3-011 have to takc 
6‘ that post, and to follow me,:’ led them up tho hill, and was the first 
man to enter the work. Here, however, he was unfortunately so~*erely 
mounded, as mas Gciiernl Chamberlain, who accompanied the assault, 
and the forcc was thus deprived of the services of its two Senior 
Officers. 
On this 
day, too, the late N3jor ILugh James, Commissioner of Pcshawur, 
arrived in camp whilst tlic figlit at the Crag was going 011, llnvil~g just 
returned from England. IIe was supposed to know more of the 
cliaracteiistics, relationships, and interior policy of the tribes, than 
any other man vho had occupied tho same positiou. At the 
same time, Gcnornl Chnmberlnin received a telegram authoriz- 
ing liim to nb,cndoii liis position and rctirc on Pcmonli, but t l k ,  
though wounded severely, and in spite of the hc91-y losses the 
force had sustained, lie refused to  do. Xajor Janies supportcd him in 
this determination, representing to tlic Gorenimcnt that thouglr 
matters werc rcry serious, retreat corild only mnkc them Tom,  and 
set liirnsclf to sow disunion amongst tlic tribcs pcnding the arrivnl of 
reinforcements. This 110 did iii a simple but n ~ s t  ingenions fimxer. 
which shows the suspicious nature of tliese mcn, as well as their 
simplicity. Hc had with liini a body of native levies, who formed J 
means of communication betreen ourselves nnd the enemy. Soinc of 
these levies 110 assembled in front of his tent, a11d, prducing a hug(. 
bundle of letters, told them they must take them to the enemy’s camp. 
This was tlic last great attack dclivcrcd by the enemy. 
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564 TTLIE I;JICETLA GAMI’AIGK. 
Then, seeming to reconsider thc question, lie took out a certain number, 
saying, Ah! well; I von’t vrite to so and S O ;  he has so little 
influence; or so and so, for his follon-ers arc so few; and making 
sonic disparaging remark about each chief named, he burnt the letters 
addressed to tlicm, to tlic number of about one-half. Thc rest he 
cliargcd the spies to g i ~ c  to thc rcmaining chiefs, with a request to takc 
tlicin away from the council fire, and rend tlicni quietly. 
IIis orders vaxc carried out, and wliilst one-half were away reading 
tlicir letters, the otliers, jealous bf their distinction, cross-questioned 
tlic spics, and discovered from thcm tlic remarks which had been made 
on themsclres by tlic Commissioncr. On tlic return of the othcr cliicfs, 
t h y  were called on to sliow their Icttcrs, and these were found to con- 
tain notliing bcxond n few ordinary compliments. ‘‘ Ali ! ” said the 
otlicrs, ‘I that won’t do. TVhcre’s tlic letter promising you money for 
gi deserting our cause? ” These, of course, ncwr existed, and tlic poor 
men liad n m c  to show ; but tlie iicgleetcd cliiefs could not be per- 
suaded to  bcliem it, and such mutual mistrust was engendered that 
tlic Boneyr tribe never again united to attack us ; SO that tlic attack 
whieli entailed tlic fall of the Crag picket, pro\-ed to  be tlicir last. 
Tlic force 1 1 0 ~ - ,  v-itli but small interruption, awaited its rcinforcc- 
mcnts, the cncmy during the same time also receiving great ncbcssions 
of strength. Indeed, tlic cscitcmcnt spread along the ~rholc border, 
and attacks r c r c  made on 11s a t  othcr points by tribes wlio Iiad long 
been neutral or friendly. On tlm reinforcements fully arriving, and 
tlic force rcacliing n strength of 9,000 men, General Gnrvoch, n410 
succeeded Sir Ncvillc Chambcrlain when tlic latter was disabled b ~ -  liis 
mound, commncnccd D forn-ard moremcnt, in anticipation of tlic 
cncmy’s proposed attack on camp, of mliicli lic liad reccircd intellid 0cncc. 
Moving out Kith t x o  brigades, lie &ox-e them along tlic ridges of 
the southern range, and took tlic Conical Rill by storm, as also the 
village of Laloo, wliich hc burned. IIc tlicn bivouacked for the night. 
In pursuancc of their original plan, Iiomerer, large bodies of tile cncmy 
liad entered the ~ a l k y ,  and learning how large a number of troops had 
quittcd tlic q n p ,  made n strong and wdl  sustaimd attack on the 
ndranccd positions. These, hon-ewr, under Colonels Brownlox and 
Keycs, resisted a11 their efforts, and mortars having been brought into 
play for tlic first time, scarelied out, with their fire the rarincs which had 
before slicltcretl tlicir parties, almost witliin stone tlirom of our works ; 
and Colonel I<cycs at Ieiigth, by n brilliant charge, drove them pell-mell 
into the ~-aIlcybelow, wlicncc they did not return. On tho 16th the force 
descended from tIic hill, taking and burning the village of Umbcyla, and 
offcrcd battle to the cncmy in face of thc rery licy of their country. 
Colonel Probyn had led liis sabres down from tlic hciglits, ncarlx 
2,000 feet, into the plains by paths supposed to bc bnrcly practicable 
lor mules, and menaced any of tlic encniy 1rho illight wnturc into the 
open. Tlicir ca-aliy prudently concealed themselves in the broken 
ground, and sarcd tlicir lires thereby. Captain Griffin, wlio liad got 
his half battery down carr$ng tlic guns and carriages on clcphants, 
now horsed it, and passing the village at  n gallop, took up B position 
011 the right, and opened firc with shell and shrapnel. The enemy 
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TIEE UYBETLA CAXPAIGX. 56.5 
gradua1ly retired, and two regiments thrown out as skirlnis11crs pressed 
their movement. Prcscntly, Iiomcvcr, a horde of Gliazccs, or fanatics, 
250 strong, mmo out of a ravine wliicli lind liitlicrto concealed them, 
and in xu instant daslied at the line, cutting right and left, anrl causiug 
some confusion. The regiments were driven back by the mere form of 
tlic onset, almost as far as' the supports which Colonel Turner Itad 
echcloncd in their rear. The enemy, \\']10 witnessed tlic conflict from 
the pass abowc, already began to descend thc pass with loud shouts. 
Tlic retirement, howcrcr, lasted only n moment, and, closing with tlie 
attacking party, the Pioneer regiments csterininatcd tlicm to thc last 
man. 
This action closed tho campaign. Tlic l30nc-p- tribe submitted, and 
:&cd for orders. Tlieir aNes had !OW fled, and they wcrc informed by 
tlie Commissioner that, to prove tlicir good faith, they must send a force 
to Mulkali, and destroy it. They ~ X - C  hostages for their pcrforinancc 
of this compact, which thcx religiously fulfilled, several Britisli officers 
accompanying them, to see the work done. Amongst theso was 
CoIoneI Adyc, and the draving before yo11 is a copy of n sIictc11 of his, 
talien ou the spot, and showing D portion of tlic town. ~ h c  troops, 
with thc cxccption of a small colunin scnt to coerce some of tl!c smaller 
tribes, mho had not yct submitted, now returned to tlicir c~utonmcnts .  
Tlic main points to mliich 1 think tllc st0l.S calls attention are thcfol- 
lowing :-1st. As it n-as by tlic dcficicncics of carriage linstily collcctcd, 
: I I I ~  orgauized on no rcgilnr systcm, that the force was delayed long 
C I ~ O U ~ I : I I  to permit of the combinations of tlic tribes, it will bc seen 
that ~ L C  successful hill cspcditions, cxccssivo liglitncss of cquipmcnt 
and cficicncy of transport should bc insisted on. 2nd. Considering 
the dclays which tlic bringing up of rcinforccincnts entailed, no forcc 
should attempt to enter tlicsc hills without n strong rcscrvc closc at 
Iiand. 3rd. Mountain-train guns of grcatcr length of r a n p  and accuracy, 
arc required. Thc 12-pound mountain-train Iiowitzcrs did good service, 
Init the 3-pounder guns comparatively little, bcing innccuratc at any 
distance, and thcir light projectiles being useless against tlic smallest 
dry stone wall. Batteries of European artillery, Iiariiig ilrrnstrong or 
Whitworth guns, of not more than 2;- cwt., each, and of long mrlges, 
miglit wit11 advantage be organized for frontier scn-ice. 
4th. A body of marksmen, carrying long range rifles, and trained, 
organized, and cquippcd for the arduous work of tlic hills, would form n 
most valuable adjunct to any force destined to opcratc there. Thc 
niountain mcn arc tliemselvcs first-rate marlmnen, seldom throw away 
:L shot, and respect anenemy for thc likc qualities ; thcy despise liim for 
tlic want of them. Thc nmrksmcn of IIcr Majesty's rcginicnts cmploxcd 
(luring thc campaign, ilid esccllcnt scrricc, but not being trained to the 
work, suffered scverely from its liarassing nature, and from wear- 
ing dress and accoutrements designed for the par&-ground, or at all 
cvcnts for to~cra1)IyIevcl country. 5th. Wc learn that no care e s p l d d  
on tlic field works, liorrcvcr smali, n-as thrown a ~ a y  ; whilst thc want 
of it mas often disastrous in its results. No ofliccr should be ignorant 
of the dcccssary precautions to bc tnkcn in trxing a work, nor thc 
height and proportions of 16s breastwork. 
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566 THE UXBEYLA CAJIPAIGN. 
Gth. Abatis, if constructedat all, should bc solidymadc and judiciously 
placcd, and traverscs thrown up where necessary, and all this, not 
undcr thc cncmy’s fire, but as a part of tlic plan of tlic work during its 
original construction. Tlicn, as tlic front or flanks of any position takcii 
up amongst such mountains a s  t!iesc,-is surc to h a w  dccp ravines in 
its imincdiate ncighbourhood, mhlch will always scrvc as p2uces d’urmes 
to tlic cncmy, mortars sliouId bc provided to dislodgc them from 
situations in which ncithcr musketry nor artillcry fire will touch tlicm. 
It continually happcncd during thc Umbcyla war that such ravincs 
formed the covcr from which thcir most formidable assaults mcre 
dclivcrcd, and until the last. fcw days the force had 110 mcans of dcaling 
with thcm until the attack had actually commcnccd. IIand p c n d c s ,  
too, and somc means of throwing a strong light in the front of thc 
sitions during thc night attacks, of illich niany took place, mould 
K v e  bccn of most essential scn-ice. 
The Amcricans ham pcrfcctcd n systcni of this kind; they also, 
instead of abatis, used tclcpaph wirc, tied from trcc to trcc, which 
l id  thc cffcct of stopping ti charge, and dctaining the cncniy for a few 
momcnts under firc ; this was exactly ivhat was rcquircd hcre. Strong 
wire, such as is used in tho tclcgraplis in India, is also thc w r y  material 
required for supportink and binding togcther an abatis not cxposcd 
to the fire of artillcry. 
The Amcricans applied nrtificial light for both attack and defcncc in 
a most ingcnious mauncr. Tho liglit was so arrangcd tlint a scrccn lcft 
either the defcndcrs or attacking party in complctc darkncss, whilst 
throwing a strong rcflcction on thcir cncmics, and somc simple con- 
trivance for producing and directing light in such a country as this 
would bc of thc greatest advantage. 
The hand-grenades, improvised of soda-water bottles filled with 
powdcr, and having a small piccc of port firc stuck in the neck, wcro 
wholly usclcss. Fcw mcn liad the courage to light thcm, and thc 
throwing thcm owr thc brcastworks, in their hurry to be rid of thcm, 
cxtinguishcd thc port firc crc it was well lighted; thusof a11 that wcrc 
prepared, not onc did any scrvicc. The fuze of a hand-grenade czn- 
not be so extinguishcd, and a supply of thcm would have been most 
uscful. 
A t  the commcncemcnt of this lecture I alluded to thc.necessity that 
might some day nrisc for extensive operations in thcsc hills, for which i t  
would bc ilI to be unpreparcd. In vindication of this allusion, allow me 
to draw your attention to the map before you, which indicates both thc 
nominal frontier of Russia, and hcr actual advancc beyond it. This may 
not be an immediate menace to our Indian posscssions, but I do not 
hesitate to afirm tliat the matter needs immediate and earnest attcn- 
tion, wise forethought, and careful preparation. It has bcen of late 
years the fashion to deride what used to bo called Russo-phobia-% 
fccling wIiicIi in old times led to thc occupation of Cabul, and our 
conncxion with the Doorance Empire. 
Our statesmen now adrocatc a policy of non-intcrvcntion in central 
Bsia, and tlic consequcncc is, that wliilgt Russia is advancing steadily to 
the line of the Syr Daiia-Alexander‘s base of opcratioiis for the con- 
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THE UJLBETLA CAXPAIGN. 567 
quest of India-wc arc nnwilling to give cvcn moral support to those 
u~lio arc opposing to this progrcss, g a l h t ,  though unfortunately 
~seless, resistance. 
But ~vliilst in Europe a policy of non-intcrwntion may be under- 
stood, and possibly e w n  respectcd, in Asia, it is quite unintclligiblc to 
tlie iiatire mind, and is but too often supposed to be clictatcd citlicrby 
~~cdi t less  or fcar. We ~ I O W  find that thc C U T O ~ S  from Bokhara, 
\vho during n whole year in vain solicited our nid, e w n  in tlic shape of 
one or two British ofliccrs to sit a t  their councils (could no more l ~ c  
done for them), arc a t  presciit at  ilIoscom; and the iicgocintions on 
which thcy arc engagcd, \rill doubtless lead to n further citension of 
Russian prestige and the Russian frontier. 
That ltussiia keeps a keen eyc to India, notviithstanding what may 
Lo said to the contrary, may bo gathered from tlie fact, that hcr 
spies pcnctratecl the entire coiintry during the mutiny, and that 
letters writtcii in Russian n:irrating cx-cry circumstancc that occurred 
wcre capturcd a t  the timc. l\'licre, as in Asia, prestige strengthens 
almost incalculably tho hands of the riding power,- her gain must be 
our loss, and her successes, even tliougli not directly against oursclvcs, 
limy lend to most serious troitblc by the cncouragcrnent they will g i w  
to tlic Inwlcss men of our border. 
AInjor Jnnies suggested, and Colonel Adyc strongly rccoinmendcd, 
:L clinngc of policy towards these men, and that instead of rainly at- 
tempting to cocrcc them by force, we should rather endeavour to  win 
tlicm to our side by measurcs of kindness and conciliation. This may 
or may not be possible,.but either nwy, tlie surest guamntco of pcncc, 
is n perfect readiness for war. 
Time \rill not permit my further pursuing this subject, but should 
I hni-e succeeded in drawing tho attention of others to one or two 
points which J 80 sincerely belieye to require it, this lecture vill haw 
fulfilled its object, and the story of the Umbeyh Campaign not been 
told in vain. 
Ladics and Gcntlcnien, I thank you for Tour kind attention. 
The CIIAIRJLW : I am surc that all prcscnt d l  ~ ~ T C C  with nic, that 
we have Iicnrd n most aclrnirablc Iccture upon n inost important and 
intercsting subjcct. I think few Kill be disposed to dcny that such 
pzpcrs have very great  due to all Englishmen, and tliat the prcscnt 
paper may bc said to lime n spccial valuc, mhcit, ns Captain Vosbcry 
has pointccl out, our northern froiiticr is likely to becomc tlic scene of 
still morc important military operations than any that linrc liitlicrto 
occiirrcd in that region. SucIi life-like skctchcs as \re Iiarc hcard from 
one n-ho lias himsclf bonc a part in the acti1-e operations of tlir 
campaign, must always bc of great interest. Certainly, it may be con- 
sidered as onc of tho advantaps of this Institution, that it prcscnt:; 
opportunities for csplaining to Englishmen that ~vliicli at all timcs is SO 
difficult of apprchcnsion. Nothing, perhaps, is more dificult than for 
English pcoplc to understand thc occurrciiccs which take plnm from 
timc to tiine in so distant a region as India, and which cxcrcisc a very 
important influence upon onr iiational history. I am sure the prescrrt 
VOL. XI. 2 Q  
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568 THE UJf BEYLA O-~XPIIIGS. 
company will support me in offering our cordial thanks to tlic Lecturer. 
As Colnncl Adye is present, and has-himself entered largely into tlic 
subjcct of this lecture, perhaps he mill fnrour us with a few obscr- 
vat ions. 
Colonel ADYC, C.B., E.A. : I should like to cxplain for a inoinent with 
regard to tlic position of tlic Russians in Central Asia. If you look 
at an old inap of Russia, of 40 years ago, you will find that the llussiaii 
frontier =as far north of the JamrtCS, whereas we Iinom wllat 
has happened since thc Crimean war, that they hare taken tlic linc 
along thc Xustau mountains. They have got steamers on the 
Caspian; they ham sunk a liiic of WCIIV across thc desert ; and they 
havc got stcamcrs on the sea of Bml. They established thcmsclres, 
fist of all, on tlic Jasaitcs, with forts down that river; tlicrcforc, 
that bccamc their line. In thc mcantimc they also arlvanccd from 
Scmipolntinsk. In  the year IS44 they came down this linc, and we 
linom now that they have got their outposts ou thc crcst of thcMustau 
mountains. UTc liavc a t  the present moxnent frequent .telegrams from 
St. Pctcrsbnrg of fighting in Bo1;ham. They arc doing on tho Osus 
what tlicy did a fen- years ago 011 tlic Jaxartcs, and I belicvc they have 
got as far as Chxjooc. They arc, apparently, taking a linc down the 
Osus. Our advanccd post is nt Peslia\\n~r ; tlierc is, thcreforc, now 
nothing between thc Russians and ourselves but Affghanistau, of 
whicli Cabul is the capital. What appears to mc is this, tliat we sliould 
cultivatc, if possiblc, the friendship of the Affglians, bccausc they are 
iiot only a ray warlikc and fiiic race of men, but they really hold our 
natural frontiers : that is to say, thcy hold the great liiic of the IIindoo 
Koosh mountains. At the present moment, wc haw a very bad and 
dangerous frontier; TTC are in the air. I do not say wc should admiice, 
bccausc n-c should get into inteiminablc war with thcsc peoplc ; but I 
do think, if v e  could succccd in gaining tlicir friendship and confidencc, 
TTC should hare in that, n great barrier agoinst the Russians. I do not 
say that thc latter arc encmics, but they may bc enemies ; at  all events 
wc h a w  this porn-erfd nation coming down towards us. We h a w  
already advanced our frontier 1,GOO miles to Pcshawur, and I think 
crciyborly will scc that these AffgLan mountains form tlic natural 
frontier for tlic English. 
Tlic CIIAIIIJIAS : The meeting is ccr;v much gratified by wIiat 
Colonel Adjc has said. I trust that Coloncl Adyc may be induced 
t o  g i r c  a lecture upon thc subjcct. In the present critical state of 
xnatters, snch n Iccturc would bc of ~ e r y  p e a t  adrantagc, iiot only 
to members of this Institution, but to the British public. 
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